In his memoirs, he listed the reasons for a continued effort: Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration from Laos along Route 9; as a base for SOG operations to harass the enemy in Laos; as an airstrip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh Trail; as the western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ; and as an eventual jump-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. [134], Westmoreland's planned relief effort infuriated the Marines, who had not wanted to hold Khe Sanh in the first place and who had been roundly criticized for not defending it well. [166] This view was supported by a captured North Vietnamese study of the battle in 1974 that stated that the PAVN would have taken Khe Sanh if it could have done so, but there was a limit to the price that it would pay. The Battle of la Drang was considered essential because it sets up a change of tactics for both troops during the conflict. Thirty-three ARVN troops were also killed and 187 were wounded. According to Gordon Rottman, even the North Vietnamese official history, Victory in Vietnam, is largely silent on the issue. The report, originally classified as secret, noted that intelligence from many sources indicated conclusively that the North Vietnamese had planned a massive ground attack against the base. The PAVN, however, were not through with the ARVN troops. "[160] That has led other observers to conclude that the siege served a wider PAVN strategy by diverting 30,000 US troops away from the cities that were the main targets of the Tet Offensive. You could lose it and you really haven't lost a damn thing. Time magazine, in an April 12, 1968, article titled Victory at Khe Sanh, reported General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, after flying into Khe Sanh by helicopter, declaring: We took 220 killed at Khe Sanh and about 800 wounded and evacuated. Beginning in October 1967, the Communists greatly increased their forces in the Khe Sanh area to total two infantry divisions, two artillery regiments and an armored regiment. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, then began planning for incursion into Laos, and in October, the construction of an airfield at Khe Sanh was completed. The September bombardments ranged from 100 to 150 rounds per day, with a maximum on 25 September of 1,190 rounds. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. "[84], Meanwhile, an interservice political struggle took place in the headquarters at Phu Bai Combat Base, Saigon, and the Pentagon over who should control aviation assets supporting the entire American effort in Southeast Asia. Although the camp's main defenses were overrun in only 13 minutes, the fighting lasted for several hours, during which the Special Forces men and Bru CIDGs managed to knock out at least five of the tanks. Just days before, as the Army of the . Two days later, the PAVN 273rd Regiment attacked a Special Forces camp near the border town of Loc Ninh, in Bnh Long Province. Once the base came under siege, a series of actions were fought over a period of five months. The North Vietnamese lost as many as 15,000 casualties during the siege of Khe Sanh. At least 852 PAVN soldiers were killed during the action, as opposed to 50 American and South Vietnamese. A secret memorandum reported by US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, sent to US President Lyndon B. Johnson on 19 February 1968, was declassified in 2005. "[155], According to military historian Ronald Spector, to reasonably record the fighting at Khe Sanh as an American victory is impossible. The attack on Khe Sanh, however, proved to be a diversionary tactic for the larger Tet Offensive. For seven weeks, American aircraft dropped from 35,000 to 40,000 tons of bombs in nearly 4,000 airstrikes. After failing to respond to a challenge, they were fired upon and five were killed outright while the sixth, although wounded, escaped. "[73], Nevertheless, ultimately the nuclear option was discounted by military planners. [58] The USAF delivered 14,356 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by air (8,120 tons by paradrop). The plane, piloted by Lt. Col. Frederick J. Hampton, crashed in a huge fireball a few miles east of Khe Sanh, killing all aboard. [150] On 31 December 1968, the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion was landed west of Khe Sanh to commence Operation Dawson River West, on 2 January 1969 the 9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment were also deployed on the plateau supported by the newly established Fire Support Bases Geiger and Smith; the 3-week operation found no significant PAVN forces or supplies in the Khe Sanh area. "[162] Those who agree with Westmoreland reason that no other explanation exists for Hanoi to commit so many forces to the area instead of deploying them for the Tet Offensive. In fact, neither side won a resounding victory. Operation Pegasus forces, however, were highly mobile and did not attack en masse down Route 9 far enough west of Khe Sanh for the NVA, by then dispersed, to implement their plan. [21], The fighting at Khe Sanh was so volatile that the Joint Chiefs and MACV commanders were uncertain that the base could be held by the Marines. [15], Unknown (1,602 bodies were counted, US official public estimated 10,00015,000 KIA,[19][20] but MACV's secret report estimated 5,550 killed as of 31 March 1968)[1]. U.S. battles of the war in Vietnam had young GIs or Marines humping into the boonies in search of the enemy. The pallet slid to a halt on the airstrip while the aircraft never had to actually land. "[168][Note 7], Marine General Rathvon M. Tompkins, the commander of the 3rd Marine Division, pointed out that had the PAVN actually intended to take Khe Sanh, PAVN troops could have cut the base's sole source of water, a stream 500 m outside the perimeter of the base. Khe Sanh had long been responsible for the defense of Lang Vei. That did not mean, however, that battle was over. 3% were Asian, 7 or . [128] Also, Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak seconded the notion that there was never a serious intention to take the base by arguing that neither the water supply nor the telephone land lines were ever cut by the PAVN. "[103] The Bru were excluded from evacuation from the highlands by an order from the ARVN I Corps commander, who ruled that no Bru be allowed to move into the lowlands. That appraisal was later altered when the PAVN was found to be moving major forces into the area. [87], Heated debate arose among Westmoreland, Commandant of the Marine Corps Leonard F. Chapman Jr., and Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. These combined sources report a total of 354 KIA. The Marines, whose aircraft and doctrine were integral to their operations, were under no such centralized control. [156] Correspondent Michael Herr reported on the battle, and his account would inspire the surreal "Do Long Bridge" scene in the film Apocalypse Now, which emphasized the anarchy of the war. [152] The Marines occupied Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau from 1966 until September 1969 when control was handed to the Army who used the position as a SOG operations and support base until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971. The explanations given out by the Saigon command were that "the enemy had changed his tactics and reduced his forces; that PAVN had carved out new infiltration routes; that the Marines now had enough troops and helicopters to carry out mobile operations; that a fixed base was no longer necessary. [127] At 08:00 the following day, Operation Scotland was officially terminated. [107] The greatest impediments to the delivery of supplies to the base were the closure of Route 9 and the winter monsoon weather. The report continues to state, "this prompted Air Force chief of staff, General John McConnell, to press, although unsuccessfully, for JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) authority to request Pacific Command to prepare a plan for using low-yield nuclear weapons to prevent a catastrophic loss of the U.S. Marine base. [12], General Creighton Abrams also suggested that the North Vietnamese may have been planning to emulate Dien Bien Phu. [131], Planning for the overland relief of Khe Sanh had begun as early as 25 January 1968, when Westmoreland ordered General John J. Tolson, commander, First Cavalry Division, to prepare a contingency plan. He has published over 20 books including: How to Survive Anything, Anywhere. Battle of Hamburger Hill The 29 th North Vietnam Army had entrenched themselves on Hamburger Hill in South Vietnam; a joint US-South Vietnamese force was ordered to remove them. TBKQS / Trung tm TBKQS - BQP - H Ni: QND, 2004. It was the only time Americans abandoned a major combat base because of enemy pressure. As the relief force made progress, the Marines at Khe Sanh moved out from their positions and began patrolling at greater distances from the base. [105], Lownds estimated that the logistical requirements of KSCB were 60 tons per day in mid-January and rose to 185 tons per day when all five battalions were in place. The site was first established near the village and later moved to the French fort. The Americans wanted a military presence there to block the infiltration of enemy forces from Laos, to provide a base for launching patrols into Laos to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and to serve as a western anchor for defense along the DMZ. [89] As a result, on 7 March, for the first time during the Vietnam War, air operations were placed under the control of a single manager. [86] The command and control arrangement then in place in Southeast Asia went against Air Force doctrine, which was predicated on the single air manager concept. If that failed, and it did, they hoped to attack American reinforcements along Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Laos. [1], The evacuation of Khe Sanh began on 19 June 1968 as Operation Charlie. Things heated up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN blocking force and fought a day-long engagement. [123][124], Nevertheless, the same day that the trenches were detected, 25 February, 3rd Platoon from Bravo Company 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was ambushed on a short patrol outside the base's perimeter to test the PAVN strength. [65] The fighting and shelling on 21 January resulted in 14 Marines killed and 43 wounded. They attacked 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 64 district capitals, five of the six major cities, and more than two dozen airfields and bases. The Battle of Khe Sanh (21 January 9 July 1968) was conducted in the Khe Sanh area of northwestern Qung Tr Province, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), during the Vietnam War. The official figure of 205 KIA only represents Marine deaths in the Operation Scotland TAORthat is, Marines killed in proximity to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. At around 10:00, the fire ignited a large quantity of explosives, rocking the base with another series of detonations. [47][Note 3] Westmoreland regarded the choice as quite simple. [20] These figures do not include casualties among Special Forces troops at Lang Vei, aircrews killed or missing in the area, or Marine replacements killed or wounded while entering or exiting the base aboard aircraft. Upon closer analysis, the official figure does not accurately portray even what it purports to represent. [40] The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 3rd Marine Regiment, under the command of Colonel John P. Lanigan, reinforced KSCB and were given the task of pushing the PAVN off of Hills 861, 881 North, and 881 South. The official statistics yield a KIA ratio of between 50:1 and 75:1 of North Vietnamese to U.S. military deaths. From the Hu site the communication signal was sent to Danang headquarters where it could be sent anywhere in the world. [62], On 20 January, La Thanh Ton, a PAVN lieutenant from the 325th Division, defected and laid out the plans for an entire series of PAVN attacks. Battlefield boundaries extended from eastern Laos eastward along both sides of Route 9 in Quang Tri province, Vietnam, to the coast. [12] With the abandonment of the base, according to Thomas Ricks, "Khe Sanh became etched in the minds of many Americans as a symbol of the pointless sacrifice and muddled tactics that permeated a doomed U.S. war effort in Vietnam". On April 5, 1968, MACV prepared an Analysis of the Khe Sanh Battle for General Westmoreland. "[24] In November 1964, the Special Forces moved their camp to the Xom Cham Plateau, the future site of Khe Sanh Combat Base. The 26th Marines were activated in 1944 and fought in the Battle of Iwo Jima during World War II and were activated again on 1 March 1966, and fought in the Battle of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam War . Lownds feared that PAVN infiltrators were mixed up in the crowd of more than 6,000, and lacked sufficient resources to sustain them. Gordan L Rottman, Osprey Campaign 150: The Khe Sanh 1967-68, p. 51. [109], The resupply of the numerous, isolated hill outposts was fraught with the same difficulties and dangers. An airborne battlefield command and control center aboard a C-130 aircraft, directed incoming strike aircraft to forward air control (FAC) spotter planes, which, in turn directed them to targets either located by themselves or radioed in by ground units. That was accomplished, but the casualties absorbed by the North Vietnamese seemed to negate any direct gains they might have obtained. Once the aircraft touched down, it became the target of any number of PAVN artillery or mortar crews. [108] The most dramatic supply delivery system used at Khe Sanh was the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System, in which palletized supplies were pulled out of the cargo bay of a low-flying transport aircraft by means of an attached parachute. Minor attacks continued before the base was officially closed on 5 July. Westmoreland believed that the latter was the case, and his belief was the basis for his desire to stage "Dien Bien Phu in reverse. In 1970, the Office of Air Force History published a then "top secret", but now declassified, 106-page report, titled The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Toward a Bombing Halt, 1968. However, even if Westmoreland believed his statement, his argument never moved on to the next logical level. Among the dead Marines was 18-year-old Pfc Curtis Bugger. The NVA 304th Divisions history notes that on 9 July 1968, the liberation flag was waving from the flag pole at Ta Con [Khe Sanh] airfield. On July 13, 1968, Ho Chi Minh sent a message to the soldiers of the Route 9Khe Sanh Front affirming our victory at Khe Sanh.. The Hill Fights (also known as the First Battle of Khe Sanh) was a battle during the Vietnam War between the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 325C Division and United States Marines on several hill masses north of the Khe Sanh Combat Base in northwest Qung Tr Province . [145], Author Peter Brush details that an "additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II through the end of June 1968". Marine Corps aviators had flown 7,098 missions and released 17,015tons. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. [32], Westmoreland responded by launching Operation Neutralize, an aerial and naval bombardment campaign designed to break the siege. Siege at Khe Sanh: ~17,200 (304th and 308th Division), Defense at Route 9: ~16,900 (320th and 324th Division), This page was last edited on 1 March 2023, at 15:52. [74], During January, the recently installed electronic sensors of Operation Muscle Shoals (later renamed "Igloo White"), which were undergoing test and evaluation in southeastern Laos, were alerted by a flurry of PAVN activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail opposite the northwestern corner of South Vietnam. Marine Khe Sanh veteran Peter Brush is Vietnam Magazines book review editor. The link-up between the relief force and the Marines at KSCB took place at 08:00 on 8 April, when the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment entered the camp. Over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped by US aircraft and over 158,000 artillery rounds were fired in defense of the base. In March 1968, an overland relief expedition (Operation Pegasus) was launched by a combined MarineArmy/ARVN task force that eventually broke through to the Marines at Khe Sanh. The attacks hindered the advancement of the McNamara Line, and as the fighting around Khe Sanh intensified, vital equipment including sensors and other hardware had to be diverted from elsewhere to meet the needs of the US garrison at Khe Sanh. On January 21 at Khe Sanh, 30,000 North Vietnamese troops attacked an air base held by just 6,000 United States Marines. [161], Whether the PAVN actually planned to capture Khe Sanh or the battle was an attempt to replicate the Vit Minh triumph against the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu has long been a point of contention. [45] In December and early January, numerous sightings of PAVN troops and activities were made in the Khe Sanh area, but the sector remained relatively quiet.[46]. Tolson was not happy with the assignment, since he believed that the best course of action, after Tet, was to use his division in an attack into the A Shau Valley. The heavy reliance on American airpower was an ominous sign for Vietnamization and . Route 9, the only practical overland route from the east, was impassable due to its poor state of repair and the presence of PAVN troops. The Khe Sanh battlefield was considerably more extensive from the North Vietnamese perspective than from that of the U.S. Marine Corps, both geographically and chronologically. [125], By mid-March, Marine intelligence began to note an exodus of PAVN units from the Khe Sanh sector. During aerial resupply:1 KC-130, 3 C-123 ARVN losses: 229 killed, 436 wounded (not including CIDG, RF/PF and SOG losses)CIDG losses: 1,000 1,500 killed or missing, at least 250 captured (in Lang Vei), wounded unknown[16] Kingdom of Laos: Unknown. The distinctions between Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II, while important from the command perspective, were not necessarily apparent to individual Marines. Stubbe examined the command chronologies of the 1st and 2nd battalions, 26th Marines, plus the after-action reports of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines; 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; and more than one dozen other units, all present at Khe Sanh under 26th Marine operational control. On 19 June 1968, the evacuation and destruction of KSCB began. [116] Marine analysis of PAVN artillery fire estimated that the PAVN gunners had fired 10,908 artillery and mortar rounds and rockets into Marine positions during the battle. As far as PAVN casualties were concerned, 1,602 bodies were counted, seven prisoners were taken, and two soldiers defected to allied forces during the operation. Operation Pegasus: ~20,000 (1st Air Cavalry and Marine units), U.S. losses:At Khe Sanh: 274 killed2,541 wounded (not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 US Army and Royal Laotian Army losses)[15]Operation Scotland I and Operation Pegasus: 730 killed2,642 wounded,7 missing[15]Operation Scotland II (15 April 1968 July 1968):485 killed2,396 wounded[1]USAF:5 ~ 20 killed, wounded unknown[1]Operation Charlie for the final evacuation:At least 11 marines killed, wounded unknown[1] The Battle of Khe Sanh began Jan. 21, 1968, with inconclusive ground activity by US and North Vietnamese patrols. [170][140], One argument that was then leveled by Westmoreland and has since often quoted by historians of the battle is that only two Marine regiments were tied down at Khe Sanh, compared with the several PAVN divisions. First had been Operation Full Cry, the original three-division invasion plan. [137] Opposition from the North Vietnamese was light and the primary problem that hampered the advance was continual heavy morning cloud cover that slowed the pace of helicopter operations. Rod Andrew, Jr., a history professor at Clemson University and colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, has written an easily read and thoroughly . At least 852 PAVN soldiers were killed during the action, as opposed to 50 American and South Vietnamese. By the end of May, Marine forces were again drawn down from two battalions to one, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. Hernandez was killed. Even so, Westmoreland insisted for it not only to be occupied by the Marines but also for it to be reinforced. [122] The majority of these were around the southern and southeastern corners of the perimeter, and formed part of a system that would be developed throughout the end of February and into March until they were ready to be used to launch an attack, providing cover for troops to advance to jumping-off points close to the perimeter. This, however, did not prevent the Marine tanks within the perimeter from training their guns on the SOG camp. Since late in 1967, Khe Sanh had depended on airlift for its survival. The Siege of Khe Sanh. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. But Pisor also pointed out that 205 is a completely false number. One had to meet certain criteria before being officially considered KIA at Khe Sanh. Unlike the official figures, Stubbes database of Khe Sanh casualties includes verifiable names and dates of death. At 1530 hours the first C-123, with 44 passengers and a crew of five, began to land. Five days later, the final reinforcements arrived in the form of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, which was deployed more for political than tactical reasons. "[105] There had been a history of distrust between the Special Forces personnel and the Marines, and General Rathvon M. Tompkins, commander of the 3rd Marine Division, described the Special Forces soldiers as "hopped up wretches [who] were a law unto themselves. Later, the 1/1 Marines and 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force (the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Airborne Battalions) would join the operation. Throughout the battle, Marine artillerymen fired 158,891 mixed rounds. The Soviet-built PT-76 amphibious tanks of the 203rd Armored Regiment churned over the defenses, backed up by an infantry assault by the 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 24th Regiment, both elements of the 304th Division. The combat losses in February and March 1967 were a prelude to the "First Battle of Khe Sanh," one of the Vietnam War's hardest-fought battles, . Ten more Marines and 89 NVA died during this period. Lownds also rejected a proposal to launch a helicopter extraction of the survivors. Overnight, they were moved to a temporary position a short distance from the perimeter and from there, some of the Laotians were eventually evacuated, although the majority turned around and walked back down Route 9 toward Laos. The main US forces defending Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps supported by elements from the United States Army and the United States Air Force (USAF), as well as a small number of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. For a succinct overview of the creation of the CIDG program and its operations. Further information on the bombing campaign: Further information on the electronic sensor system: Westmoreland's plan to use nuclear weapons, President Johnson orders that the base be held at all costs, Operation Charlie: evacuation of the base. In 1966, the regular Special Forces troops had moved off the plateau and built a smaller camp down Route 9 at Lang Vei, about half the distance to the Laotian border. [119] By 11:00, the battle was over, Company A had lost 24 dead and 27 wounded, while 150 PAVN bodies were found around the position, which was then abandoned. Unlike the Marines killed in the same place in January, since Operation Scotland had ended, the four Lima Company Marines who died in this attack on Hill 881 North were excluded from the official statistics. If a battle tallied a sufficiently favorable body count ratio, American commanders declared victory, as they did after Khe Sanh. [29], During the second half of 1967, the North Vietnamese instigated a series of actions in the border regions of South Vietnam. By comparison, according to another Army general, a 10:1 ratio was considered average and 25:1 was considered very good. [9], The precise nature of Hanoi's strategic goal at Khe Sanh is regarded as one of the most intriguing unanswered questions of the Vietnam War. The United States and its South Vietnamese allies pulled many huge offensive . For them, the battle started when the North Vietnamese attacks began in January. Many American casualties were caused by the 10,908 rounds of rockets, artillery and mortars the North Vietnamese fired into the base and hill positions. Name State Date War Branch; 1: Steven Glenn Abbott . Scotland was a 26th Marine Regiment operation, so only the deaths of Marines assigned to the regiment, and attached supporting units, were counted. The dead men have been described as wearing Marine uniforms; that they were a regimental commander and his staff on a reconnaissance; and that they were all identified, by name, by American intelligence. Of the 24 Americans at the camp, 10 had been killed and 11 wounded. This time period does not particularly coincide with the fighting; rather, it dates from before the siege began and terminates before the siege (and the fighting) ended. Had the plane been shot down departing Khe Sanh, the casualties would have been counted. With Khe Sanh facing a full-scale. Additionally, the logistical effort required to support the base once it was isolated demanded the implementation of other tactical innovations to keep the Marines supplied. Khe Sanh was situated on Route 9, the major east-west highway. [165], Another interpretation was that the North Vietnamese were planning to work both ends against the middle, a strategy that has come to be known as the Option Play. Dien Bien Phu would loom large for the rest of the war, especially during the Battle of Khe Sanh. Many of the artillery and mortar rounds stored in the dump were thrown into the air and detonated on impact within the base. 216217. One headquarters would allocate and coordinate all air assets, distributing them wherever they were considered most necessary, and then transferring them as the situation required. By the middle of January 1968, some 6,000 Marines and Army troops occupied the Khe Sanh Combat Base and its surrounding positions. The United States Marines gave the actual body count of the NVA troops killed to be 1,602, but estimates show that the total number of NVA troops . The Marine garrison was also reinforced, and on November 1, 1967, Operation Scotland began. [31] Mortar rounds, artillery shells, and 122mm rockets fell randomly but incessantly upon the base. The Marines fought long, hard and well at Khe Sanh, but they sacrificed in much greater numbers than has been acknowledged by official sources. Shortly after midnight on February 7, a large NVA force, reinforced with tanks, attacked the camp. [129][130] Nevertheless, according to Tom Johnson, President Johnson was "determined that Khe Sanh [would not] be an 'American Dien Bien Phu'". For some unknown reason, the PAVN troops did not press their advantage and eliminate the pocket, instead throwing a steady stream of grenades at the Marines. After a ten-day battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. After a ten-day battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. Early in the war US forces had established a garrison at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri province, in the . [97] During a meeting at Da Nang at 07:00 the next morning, Westmoreland and Cushman accepted Lownds' decision. "[52], Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous: "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. Two further attacks later in the morning were halted before the PAVN finally withdrew. Operation Pegasus casualties included 59 U.S. Army and 51 Marine Corps dead. A group of 12 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers provided flak suppression for massed flights of 1216 helicopters, which would resupply the hills simultaneously. By early January, the defenders could count on fire support from 46 artillery pieces of various calibers, five tanks armed with 90-mm guns, and 92 single or Ontos-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles. Background [ edit] New material will be added to that page through the end of 2018. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1 Marines) and the 2/3 Marines would launch a ground assault from Ca Lu Combat Base (16km east of Khe Sanh) and head west on Route 9 while the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division, would air-assault key terrain features along Route 9 to establish fire support bases and cover the Marine advance. Fighting around Khe Sanh was continuous. Construction on the line was ultimately abandoned and resources were later diverted towards implementing a more mobile strategy. Sunday marked the 50th anniversary of the start of the war's most famous siege, a 77-day struggle for a rain-swept plateau in central Vietnam that riveted the U.S. in 1968, and opened a year of . U.S. Marines and their allies killed thousands of NVA, but to solve the riddle of Khe Sanh, you have to recount the numbers. Westmoreland planned on Khe Sanh being relieved and then used as the jump-off point for a "hot pursuit" of enemy forces into Laos. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet.